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China is located in East Asia and, just as Japan, Taiwan or (South) Korea at earlier stages of their 
development, has now grown very rapidly for some three decades. That is not enough, however, for it to 
qualify for membership of the club. The East Asian development model has a number of additional and 
important characteristics. Four are selected for discussion: the almost constant encouragement given to 
investment, the manufacturing sector and external competitiveness, and pursued via a variety of fairly 
interventionist industrial, trade and financial policies; a concomitant belief in the virtues of intense 
domestic (Japan and Taiwan) and foreign (Korea) competition; a set of broadly sensible and appropriate 
macroeconomic policies; and a number of favourable (pre-)conditions, such as the presence of a 
homogeneous population, a relatively high stock of human capital, reasonable income equality and fairly 
authoritarian governments. China, since reforms began in the late 1970s, has shared some of these 
characteristics, but not all. In particular, it is still much more of a command economy than the other three 
countries have ever been, yet, at the same time, has embraced globalization with, arguably, much greater 
enthusiasm than was done, in earlier times, by Japan, Taiwan or Korea. If China’s experience, however, is 
compared with that of other, more or less successful, developing countries, the similarities with the East 
Asia development model would seem to dwarf such differences.  
JEL codes: N10, N15, O53, P52 
Keywords: China, Growth, East Asia, Economic Policy 
Introduction 
The exceptional economic history of countries such as Japan, Taiwan, (South) 
Korea and the city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore, has often been put forward as 
exemplifying a unique and extremely successful East Asian model of development. In 
one very simple sense China is obviously part of this experience if only because it is also 
located in East Asia and its growth since the late 1970s has been just as rapid as that of 
its neighbours. This is shown in Chart 1 which plots the level of China’s GDP per capita 
at purchasing power parity (PPP) over the 25 years that go from 1980 (just after the 
beginning of reforms) to 2005 and compares it with similar data for Japan (over the 
period 1950-75), Taiwan (1960-85) and Korea (1965-90). The particular time-spans 
chosen are the quarter centuries (beginning or ending with round figures) that have 
exhibited the fastest growth rates in each of the four countries respectively. They also 
happen to more or less overlap with what the literature would consider as having been 
the periods of successful economic take off in the three countries. Hong Kong and 
Singapore are not being considered in what follows given that their limited size makes 
comparisons with China even more hazardous than with, say, Korea or Taiwan. 
Geography and rapid growth may be necessary conditions for admittance to the 
“East Asian club”, but they are clearly not sufficient ones. A number of other important 
economic, institutional and social features have been selected in the literature as crucial 
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to the East Asian model of development and, arguably, China may not have shared in 
all, or even any, of these. 
The following will first briefly sketch what these features may have been. The 
second and third sections will then look at similarities and differences between China’s 
experience and that of the other three East Asian countries here considered, while a 
brief conclusion will try and pass judgment on whether China did, or did not, conform 
to that model of development. 
1.  The East Asian Development Model 
There is no agreed definition of what constitutes the East Asian model of 
development. How economies grew, how industrial structures were transformed, how 
governments intervened in solving coordination problems, pursuing efficient policies, 
making credible commitments, etc. varied depending on time and location [Haggard, 
2004]. Different writers select different characteristics, often depending on what country 
(or countries) they are studying, and, at times, in function of their ideological 
preferences. At the clear risk of over-simplification, but so as to maintain the discussion 
manageable, four major features will be selected that have, arguably, been both common 
to, and crucial for, the experiences of Japan, Taiwan and Korea (henceforth JTK) over 
the periods here examined:
4 
 
i.  An almost constant emphasis on the importance for rapid growth of investment, 
the manufacturing sector and external competitiveness, an emphasis that was 
translated into interventionist industrial, trade, financial and other policies; 
ii.  A concomitant belief in the virtues of a competitive economy in which firms, 
while often protected from foreign companies and in downturns, would be 
expected to be able to fend for themselves against domestic rivals and on the 
world market; 
iii.  A set of broadly sensible and appropriate macroeconomic policies, normally 
aiming at budgetary balance, or even surplus, and trying to prevent high and 
variable rates of inflation; 
iv.  A number of favourable pre-conditions of a broader socio-economic and political 
nature, such as homogenous (and slow growing) populations, high levels of 
human capital formation, relatively equal patterns of income distribution (thanks 
partly to prior agricultural reforms), competent bureaucracies and fairly 
authoritarian governments through much of the periods here considered. 
 
A high level of external competitiveness was almost certainly one of the primary 
aims of economic policy in all the three countries. Both the demonstration effect of 
other successful, developed economies and relative natural resource-scarcity, meant that 
competitiveness had to be achieved in the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, required 
(usually foreign) technology and high levels of fixed investment so as to achieve 
economies of scale. Since not all sectors could be encouraged at the same time, 
governments consciously selected some activities rather than others, on the strength of 
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earlier experience in industrialized countries and guesses as to the likely values of 
income elasticities of demand on world markets. 
That such industrial policies were important is seen by the many plans that 
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (particularly in the 1950s 
and 1960s) and Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB) (particularly in the 1960s and 
1970s) launched to try and foster the development of selected manufacturing sectors, 
often, though not invariably, in heavy industry. Taiwan’s Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD) may have eschewed formal plans, but also 
intervened with what have been called “nudging” policies, designed to persuade 
companies to move in certain directions [Wade, 2004]. In all the three countries, this 
“picking winners”, or even better “making of winners” [ibid., p.334], used a panoply of 
measures to encourage investment at home and improve competitiveness abroad. 
Fixed investment, which reached record high levels in all the three countries, 
was directly stimulated by public investment provisions (particularly in Taiwan and 
Korea) [Rodrik, 1995] which helped to “crowd-in” private sector capital formation. In 
addition came preferential treatment in public sector purchases, standard tax 
concessions on reinvested profits or on depreciation allowances, or not so standard 
interest rate subsidies. Important too, at least in Japan and Korea (though to some 
extent also in Taiwan [Wade, 2004]), were severe restrictions on foreign direct 
investment (FDI), designed to protect domestic firms from takeovers. And investment 
was also, arguably, aided by a financial system that put a lot of emphasis on bank 
finance and on relatively high debt/equity ratios. A further, indirect, help to investment 
came from an ample supply of domestic savings. These were already high from the 
outset in Japan, but policy contributed in further boosting them, through, for instance, 
budget surpluses (and possibly, also, by limiting the availability of consumer credit). 
Competitiveness was strongly aided by numerous subtle, or not so subtle, forms of 
protectionism against foreign producers. These included straightforward policies of 
import substitution, direct or indirect export subsidies, preferential foreign exchange 
allocation, and, at times, exchange rate undervaluation. It is true, of course, that with the 
passing of time, and as the economies developed, many such features of interventionism 
faded away, but in the high growth quarter centuries here selected, they were clearly 
present. 
A major theme running through the literature is the issue as to whether these 
various forms of industrial policy played a large, or even overwhelming, role in the 
successes of JTK or were, alternatively, only very minor (or possibly even counter-
productive) contributors to a story dominated by the free interplay of market forces. On 
the one hand is a school that sees governments as having successfully influenced the 
course of events [e.g., Amsden, 1989; Vestal, 1993; Rodrik, 1995; Wade, 2004]. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum are works that belittle the influence of public policy [e.g., 
Little 1979; Beason and Weinstein, 1996]. A major World Bank investigation into the 
issue concluded, rather sceptically, that industrial policies may, at most, have had only a 
small positive impact on outcomes [World Bank, 1993].  While the present writer has his 
own views [Boltho, 1985], for present purposes there is no real need to take a position 
on this fascinating debate. Whether government intervention was successful or not in 
promoting development in East Asia, it cannot be denied that it played a very important 
role and represents, therefore, a crucial component of the “model”. 
Interestingly, protection and intervention were accompanied by a firm belief in 
the virtues of competition both at home and on world markets, a belief that stands in 270 
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sharp contrast to the more usual industrial policies carried out in other developing 
countries. In Japan competition was, for instance, encouraged by the allocation of scarce 
and highly desirable foreign technology by MITI not to just one, but to several rival 
claimants among the keiretsu groups that dominated the economy [Boltho, 2002]. In 
Korea it was fostered by the practice of granting subsidies to the large chaebols  on 
condition that these fulfilled stringent performance standards (usually in terms of 
import-substitution or export targets on world markets) [Amsden, 1989]. In Taiwan it 
was more easily promoted by the existence of a large network of small and medium-
sized firms. And partly as a result, product market competition, at least in the 
manufacturing sector, was usually fierce in all the three economies. 
A third important characteristic of the “East Asian model” that has attracted 
attention, has been a set of fairly conservative macroeconomic policies [World Bank, 
1993]. This too stands in contrast to the policy stance often (though not invariably) 
followed in other developing economies. On the fiscal policy front, all three countries, 
seem to have run budget surpluses over the period as a whole (Table 1).
5 The deficits 
that were occasionally incurred tended to reflect the impact of cyclical downswings 
rather than the launching of large expenditure programmes and these deficits were never 
financed by the Central Bank [Fry, 1985]. Nor did this prevent Japan, at least, from 
setting up in the 1970s and 1980s a generous welfare state. It is more difficult to assess 
the stance of monetary policy since interest rates were often controlled, as was the 
growth of credit (any resulting imbalances being reflected in either rationing or in the 
prices set on “kerb” or secondary markets). Very rough estimates of real interest rates 
(on lending), that are not strictly comparable across countries, suggest that these were 
positive in most years (Table 1). And, indirectly, policy appears to have been no more 
than accommodating to the needs of very rapidly growing economies, since inflation 
seldom reached exceptional levels. The oil shocks of the mid- and late1970s did lead to 
sharp inflationary outbursts, but these were then quickly reined in (with only Korea 
standing out as a partial exception in the later 1970s). 
Finally, stress has also been put on several other features of a wider socio-
economic nature. Two, in particular, seem to have been important: a long-standing 
stress on the importance of education, and patterns of income distribution that were 
relatively equal by international standards (thanks in part to land-redistributing 
agricultural reforms at the beginning of the various periods). And, income distribution 
may even have become more equal during the rapid growth years, contrary to what one 
might have expected [Ranis, 1985]. High rates of human capital formation must have 
eased the path of subsequent industrialization; absence of major inequalities may have 
helped in encouraging investment at the expense of consumption, since “sacrifices” 
were, more or less, equally shared. Indeed, econometric work suggests that initial 
equality and initial levels of primary school enrolment can explain a good deal of East 
Asia’s subsequent successful growth experience [Rodrik, 1994]. 
Further not purely economic pre-conditions that have received attention in the 
literature have been the presence of a homogenous population and of a competent 
bureaucracy [World Bank, 1993], apparently little affected by corruption and often able 
to withstand political interference (this must have greatly reduced the incidence of rent-
seeking, an always present danger in countries in which bureaucratic intervention aims 
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to protect or encourage particular activities or sectors). Finally, none of the three 
countries was a liberal democracy in the Western sense through most of the periods 
here considered. At best, they were “tightly circumscribed” democracies [Wade, 2004, 
p.xviii]. Japan was dominated by a single party, Korea and Taiwan were both relatively 
authoritarian states. Arguably, economic decision-making may have been facilitated by 
the presence of a strong central government. 
2.  Similarities 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the buoyant transformation that China has 
experienced since its economic reforms were launched in late 1978 looks very different 
to the much more gradual developments seen in the three other countries here 
examined. However interventionist JTK may have been, none started the period with a 
near-Stalinist form of central planning and none ended the period with a mixed 
economy in which many aspects of a command system were still present. And by the 
same token, neither Japan nor Taiwan nor Korea, even if they gradually liberalized their 
economies through time, changed their systems as radically as did China. This being 
said, just as one is struck by such glaring differences, one can be similarly struck by 
other stark similarities. 
These are most apparent at the macroeconomic level. The Introduction already 
pointed out how GDP growth rates were very similar. The same seems to have been 
true for total factor productivity growth, at least as far as Japan and China are 
concerned. A recent investigation [Maddison, 2009], shows for instance that, for the 
slightly different time spans of 1952-78 and 1978-2003, GDP growth rates for Japan 
and China were identical (at 7.9 per cent per annum), while total factor productivity 
growth rates were very similar (3.3 and 3.0 per cent per annum respectively). 
Rapid growth, in turn, was made possible, a s i n JTK, by  high sa vin gs , high  
investment, and high external competitiveness. Similarly to Japan, savings were already 
very substantial at the outset of the period and then rose to levels probably not 
previously recorded anywhere else in the world. The same is broadly true of gross fixed 
capital formation (Chart 2). There were, of course, differences in behaviour. More of 
China’s savings, particularly in recent years, came from the corporate sector than was 
probably the case elsewhere in East Asia. And the investment effort of JTK was largely 
private (even if in Taiwan and Korea public investment was also important) [Rodrik, 
1995]. To be sure, the authorities were active via subsidized credit and other 
concessions, but hardly ever seem to have taken detailed investment decisions. By 
contrast, much of China’s investment took place in the state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
sector in which the government intervened very heavily by providing vast financial 
resources. The significantly more dynamic private sector has had much greater 
difficulties in getting access to funds, even though it has been estimated that its return 
on capital is more than 50 per cent higher than that of the SOEs [Perkins and Rawski, 
2008]. Clearly, China has permitted the existence, but hardly supported the efforts, of its 
private domestic firms. 
Similarities in success also emerge at the external level. Chart 3, for instance, 
plots the rising share of East Asia’s four countries’ exports in the world market for 
manufactures. Japan’s rising penetration in the 1950s and 1960s is striking, as are those 
of Taiwan and Korea (much smaller countries, after all) in the 1970s and 1980s. What 
China has accomplished since the late 1980s, looks even more impressive. To some 
extent this outcome may have been helped by exchange rate policy, more so probably 272 
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than in JTK. Chart 4 presents some simple estimates of real exchange rates for the four 
countries.
6 However imperfect the data may be, the Chinese trend is sufficiently striking 
to suggest that exchange rate depreciation, at least until the mid-1990s, must have been 
an important component of China’s external success. It is true that the exchange rate 
was substantially overvalued at the outset of the period [Lardy, 1994], but its subsequent 
depreciation was of the order of nearly 70 per cent.
7 Depreciation seems to have been 
much less in evidence in JTK, at least according to the Chart (though it should not be 
forgotten that both Taiwan and Korea did devalue their currencies quite significantly in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s respectively). 
A further similarity probably lies in the broadly shared belief in all four countries 
that competitive market conditions are crucial for rapid economic growth. As already 
mentioned above, in Japan this competition took mainly place between the rival national 
conglomerates which were all active in most sectors; in Korea it was forced upon large 
domestic groups by making government support conditional on export successes on the 
world market; in Taiwan it was the almost inevitable consequence of a more fragmented 
industrial structure. China may still be providing soft budget constraints to some of its 
SOEs, but it has, over the last decade, forced many to either merge or close down. 
Indeed, in some areas (e.g., oil or telecoms) it seems now to be following Japanese 
practices, by establishing oligopolistic competition among a few major enterprises 
[Naughton, 2008]. More broadly, it accepted, indeed welcomed, the intense competition 
that arose internally among so-called township and village enterprises (TVEs) and other 
small private firms, as it liberalized the economy in the 1980s, and the further 
competitive pressures that came from its rapid opening to the world economy in the 
1990s and thereafter.
8 
Interestingly, China may have also benefited from a further element of domestic 
competition not present in the much more centralized JTK, namely interregional 
competition. Partly because of its size, the country has had a long tradition of 
decentralization. Even in the command economy period, for instance, the central plan 
controlled probably less than half of industrial output [Brandt et al., 2008]. Over the last 
three decades of much more open markets, scope was given to decentralized 
experimentation in novel institutions and forms of organization [Brandt and Rawski, 
2008]. The provision of tax receipts has also led local governments to compete against 
each other by concentrating spending on productive investment and trying to create 
hospitable economic environments designed, in particular, to attract FDI [Qian and 
Weingast, 1996]. 
Broadly similar too were the macroeconomic stances followed by the four 
countries. As in JTK, the Chinese government has pursued a prudent fiscal policy 
(witness the virtual absence of public debt), and achieved a modest budget surplus over 
the period as a whole. Measuring the stance of monetary policy is, as in JTK, difficult 
given that interest rates have usually been controlled. Rough estimates of real lending 
                                                 
6 Since data unavailability precludes the use of real effective exchange rates based on the development of 
unit labour costs, Chart 4 uses a much simpler proxy, namely relative wholesale price developments. For 
Japan, these are limited to the US, for Taiwan, Korea and China to the US and Japan (with weights of 
75 per cent and 25 per cent respectively). 
7 An alternative (and more appropriate) IMF estimate of China’s real exchange rate, based on unit labour 
costs, arrives at a real depreciation between 1984 and 1993 of as much as 85 per cent [Wang, 2004]. 
8 “Reform has pushed China’s economy towards extraordinarily high levels of competition. Despite 
pockets of monopoly and episodic local trade barriers, intense competition now pervades everyday 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
273
rates, however, indicate that these were also positive (Table 1). Moreover, the absence 
of virulent inflation, just as in Japan and Taiwan, does indirectly suggest that policy, 
while accommodating to the needs of a rapidly growing economy, was hardly reckless. 
And on the two occasions in which inflation did touch double digits, the authorities’ 
reaction was very prompt. 
A proper macroeconomic policy framework needs an efficient bureaucracy that 
is not prey to political interests or tainted by corruption. JTK all benefited, at the outset 
of the period, from the absence of a politically powerful dominant class [Aoki et al., 
1996]. Landlords had been eliminated by agricultural reform; industrial interests had 
either been annihilated by the war and subsequent reforms in Japan, or had never really 
been allowed to develop in Taiwan or Korea by Japanese colonialism; labour interests 
had been emasculated by the Cold War [ibid.]. The bureaucracy (and political leaders) 
could thus fill the vacuum. And while corruption was hardly unknown in the three 
countries, it may well have mainly taken the form of what has been called “high level” 
corruption. This is, arguably, less costly and inefficient than graft at all levels of 
government [Rodrik, 1994]. China does not fit this picture in every single aspect. The 
party represented an all-powerful dominant class, but it did allow economic reforms in 
exchange for maintenance of its political predominance. And while corruption has been 
rampant (more so, almost certainly than in JTK),
9 this did not prevent the adoption of 
broadly sensible macroeconomic policies and clearly efficiency-enhancing liberalization 
programmes. 
Turning finally, to broader considerations that are not purely of an economic 
nature, some East Asian constants apply to China as they did to JTK. Thus, the 
population is broadly homogenous, the government has been authoritarian (indeed, a 
good deal more so than elsewhere), and demographic growth has been very subdued 
(even if population growth rates came down in China for reasons different from those 
that reduced them in JTK). More importantly, investment in human capital had already 
been substantial before rapid growth began. Table 2 presents estimates of the adult 
population’s educational achievements at the outset of the periods here selected. It will 
be seen that despite China’s relative poverty, its levels of human capital formation in 
1980, while paling relative to those of Japan in 1950, were quite impressive by the 
standards of both Taiwan and many other much richer areas of the developing world. 
3.  Differences 
Yet, not everything in China has run on lines similar to those of JTK. An 
interesting difference emerges in the area of income distribution. All four countries, 
thanks partly to early agricultural reforms, began their high growth years with relatively 
equal distribution patterns (indeed in China these were extremely equal by international 
standards). Interestingly, however, while these patterns were broadly maintained in JTK, 
they broke down in China. A country that still proclaims its socialist status, presided 
over an exceptionally rapid opening of income differentials [Naughton, 2007], possibly 
even more rapid than the one that occurred in Russia, following the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union. By now, China could be a society that is less equal than that of the United 
                                                 
9 There are virtually no comparable data on corruption, other than those which come from a body called 
Transparency International. These are only available from 1995 onwards. For that year they suggest the 
following levels of corruption (the higher the figure, out of a scale of 10, the greater is corruption’s 
incidence): Japan 3.3, Taiwan 4.9, Korea 5.7, China 7.8. The absolute figures may not be very precise, 
the rankings seem plausible. 274 
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States. It is true, of course, that rapid growth lifted a large percentage of the population 
out of poverty, but then not dissimilar successes were also recorded in JTK, without this 
leading to the dramatic opening in income gaps that has been in evidence in China. 
Though efforts are now being made to try and mitigate some of the more extreme 
urban/rural and regional differences in income distribution that have emerged, 
particularly over the last decade, it is highly unlikely that China will be able to achieve 
anything like the income differentials that were (and to some extent still are) prevalent in 
JTK. 
A possibly more important set of differences lies in the broad field of external 
competitiveness and industrial policy. Competitiveness mattered to the Chinese 
authorities just as much as it did to JTK, as indirectly shown by the very early creation 
(already in 1979, when the country was still almost autarchic) of Special Economic 
Zones devoted solely to export production. And many of the instruments initially used 
by China to improve its trade performance were similar to the policies used in JTK, e.g., 
various forms of protection (such as high tariffs and non-trade barriers to encourage 
import substitution), mandatory export targets for SOEs, as well as a panoply of other 
incentives [World Bank, 1993]. 
Yet, some of the policies used to pursue external competitiveness were strikingly 
different. Where Japan and Korea, in particular, emphasized plans for specific industries 
deemed to be important, China’s industrial planning seems to have played much less of 
a role. Five-year plans were regularly published (partly to pay lip service to Communist 
ideology), enumerating sectors and activities chosen for promotion, but these, in fact, 
read like wish lists for almost everything. In the 1980s, for instance, “the Chinese state 
tried to interfere with too many industries” [Xia, 2000, p.90]. As an example, the 
industrial policy plan of 1989 wanted to foster some light industries, basic industries, 
intermediate products, machinery and electronics, light-tech industry, exports, 
infrastructure, etc., etc. The only sectors that were to be discouraged were going to be 
“low quality” products and “luxury” consumer goods [Lu and Tang, 1997]. In part this 
may, of course, reflect the country’s dimension. JTK had to be selective, China could go 
for a “big push” strategy given that the size of its potential market would ensure scale 
economies in virtually any industry. Yet, comparative advantage applies to China just as 
to any other economy. And there does not seem to have been as conscious a design to 
“create” comparative advantage as there clearly had been in JTK. While help to industry 
was lavishly extended, it was overwhelmingly directed, in indiscriminate ways, at (the 
often inefficient) SOEs. It is these that obtained easy access to state-bank credits, were 
granted preferential tax rates, were assured of government purchases, etc., but, until 
recently at least, hardly figured among the major exporters. 
China’s external competitiveness was promoted not so much by targeting 
particular sectors or firms, but by a much less planned system, reliant on two major 
actors that find few equivalents in Japan and Korea, at least: the vast sector of small 
TVEs, nominally in public hands, but overwhelmingly private (or, in any case, neither 
controlled nor helped by the central authorities), and foreign firms [Huang, 2008]. The 
latter were particularly important. Using the trading skills of the Chinese diaspora in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan and the cheap labour and other facilities available in many of 
China’s coastal provinces, foreign enterprises invested massively in the country. And in 
this China’s policy has differed very importantly from the policies of JTK. Whereas 
those three economies were broadly hostile to most FDI, unless it could be directly 
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onwards, welcomed it. Looking at the share of FDI in gross fixed capital formation over 
the four quarter centuries here considered, one finds stark differences: in Japan (1950-
75), FDI accounted for 0.2 per cent of total fixed investment; in Taiwan (1960-85) and 
in Korea (1965-90) the corresponding figures were 2.4 and 1.6 per cent respectively, 
while in China (1980-2005) this ratio was as high as 7.0 per cent. While little help was 
extended to TVEs, “to the [limited] extent that the Chinese government has provided a 
space for private capital, it has shown a revealed preference for foreign over domestic 
firms” [Haggard and Huang, 2008, p.338]. 
Competitiveness would thus appear to have come more from spontaneous 
market forces than it did in JTK. In some ways, one principal source was the desire, 
indeed necessity, for small countries such as Honk Kong, but also Taiwan and Korea, 
“to provide space for the expansion of [their own] economi[es]” [Naugthon, 1996, 
p.315]. It s true that from the mid-1990s onwards, China seems to have developed a 
more targeted approach to industrial policy, with priority given to certain sectors (or 
“pillars”), such as cars, petrochemicals, telecommunications, high-tech activities, etc. 
[Perkins, 2001; Naughton, 2007]. In the electronics field, in particular, the authorities did 
their best to obtain technology transfers from foreign owned enterprises, in exchange 
for market access, so as to create joint ventures first and national “champions” later 
[Rodrik, 2006; Zhao et al., 2007]. A similar approach has also been followed in the car 
components sector. Yet the absence of an equivalent to MITI or the EPB, as well as the 
(already mentioned) greater diffusion of economic power to local governments, almost 
certainly reduced the effectiveness and coherence of these policies [Xia, 2000; Rodrik, 
2006]. In any case, even when pressure was exerted on foreign firms to collaborate with, 
or help, specific domestic firms, this was hardly similar to Japan’s creation from virtually 
nothing of a nationally-owned polyethylene industry or Korea’s similar development of 
shipbuilding. The creation of China’s electronic industry was the result of FDI 
[Branstetter and Lardy, 2008]. The choice of sectors to be promoted, in other words, 
did not come from China. It was determined by major foreign investors, with the 
Chinese authorities merely trying to shift some of the rents to their chosen domestic 
players. 
This points to a second major differences between China’s development strategy 
and that of JTK. The country’s external policy has been much more open than those of, 
especially, Japan and Korea. This was true not only for FDI, but also for trade. Chart 5 
shows how rapidly the country’s foreign trade/GDP ratio rose over the period, 
especially if compared to what happened in Japan or even Korea.
10 From the mid-1990s 
onwards, in particular, China began preparing for its eventual WTO entry and this 
involved a fairly radical dismantling of much of its protectionist apparatus [Branstetter 
and Lardy, 2008]. There would seem to have been much less opening in, for instance, 
the Japan of 1965, the Taiwan of 1975 or the Korea of 1980. Trade liberalization came, 
of course, eventually, as all three countries did away with their restrictive foreign trade 
regimes, but it had hardly happened by the end of the three quarter centuries here 
considered. China, on the other hand, opened earlier and in its WTO negotiations 
                                                 
10 The level figures shown in Chart 5 are, of course, strongly influenced by country size. Hence, it would 
be expected that Taiwan and Korea would show higher foreign trade/GDP ratios than Japan, let alone 
China. The latter’s figures are, however, much higher than might have been expected. It is true that the 
massive gap between Chinese GDP data in dollars and in PPPs, leads to an overestimate of China’s 
foreign trade ratio relative to those of more mature economies [Naughton, 1996] such as JTK. Even so, 
however, the rise in the ratio is still spectacular. 276 
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“agreed to a set of conditions that were far more stringent than the terms under which 
other developing countries had acceded” [ibid., p.650]. And all the available evidence 
suggests that since China joined the WTO, it “has made reasonable progress towards 
meeting her obligations” [ibid., p.633].
11 
This much greater readiness to embrace an open world economy suggests that 
there is a third major difference between the development paths of China and of JTK. 
Given that export successes came from foreign and smaller enterprises, they turned out 
to have been concentrated, at least initially, in relatively light industrial products of a 
labour-intensive nature, as these firms went about exploiting the country’s factor 
endowment. While Japan and Korea, in particular,
12 targeted heavy industry and were 
able to gradually shift away from an initial export bundle that was either light industry- 
or natural resource-intensive, China went almost in the opposite direction, moving away 
from the very heavy industry that had been the hallmark of its industrialization in the 
central planning years and towards light manufacturing. Thus, the weight of SOEs in 
total industrial production plummeted from 80 to 15 per cent in the 25 years to 2000 
[Perkins and Rawski, 2008] (SOEs are, of course, not synonymous with heavy industry, 
but the overlap is strong). The weight of TVEs and foreign enterprises, on the other 
hand, rose correspondingly. In some ways, China’s pattern of development and foreign 
trade specialization seems more similar to that of the South-East Asian countries than to 
the one of its three closer neighbours. 
Some indirect confirmation of this is provided by Chart 6 which looks at the 
correlation in revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices in 1980 and 2005 between 
China on the one hand and three other Asian areas on the other. China’s RCAs were 
hardly correlated with those of JTK in 1980. By 2005, not only had they not moved any 
closer; the correlation had actually become negative. A much more important overlap is 
shown to have existed over the period as a whole with what was happening in both 
South and South East Asia (the highest correlations are those between China on the one 
hand and Vietnam and Sri Lanka on the other). The 2005 data indicate that China seems 
to be leaving South Asia behind and approaching the trading patterns of South East 
Asia, but this still suggests a comparative advantage pattern largely rooted in factor 
endowment.
13 
It is true that over the period the country’s export bundle witnessed a significant 
structural transformation, not that dissimilar from the one experienced by JTK in earlier 
decades. China, just as Taiwan and Korea, abandoned its specialization in primary 
products and, just as Japan and Korea, shifted its comparative advantage to the 
machinery sector. Thus, the correlation coefficient between China’s RCA in 2005 and 
that of JTK in 1980 (at 0.44) is higher than any of those (bar one) shown in Chart 6. It 
should be noted, however, that while exports of machinery and information technology 
                                                 
11 Circumstances were, of course, different in the more recent period than they had been earlier in the 
post-war world when FDI flows were small, trade controls were much more widespread, and exchange 
rates were, if not fixed, at least much stickier than they have been since the early 1970s, [Perkins, 2001]. 
12 Taiwan did not neglect heavy industry, even if it did not give it quite the same importance as the two 
other countries. To quote one significant example, “all three East Asian governments controlled the 
market structure of the petrochemical industry by limiting the number of firms allowed to enter” [Kim 
and Ma, 1996, p.107]. 
13 Indeed, not much seems to have changed since, for instance, the early 1980s, when a simple correlation 
between RCA indices in 53 labour-intensive products in China and other developing countries, 
suggested that there was a significant overlap with the export structures of, for instance, Thailand, Sri 
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goods have risen rapidly, so have imports of components, suggesting that a good deal of 
what is done in the country is mere assembly work, relying on cheap domestic labour 
[Branstetter and Lardy, 2008]. In addition, these exports are very different from the 
machine tools, cars and ships which were sold by Japan and Korea in their rapid growth 
years.
 Thus, China’s electronic sales abroad have lower unit values than those of, for 
instance, Korea, Malaysia or Singapore, an indication that they are likely to be, 
overwhelmingly, labour-intensive, low cost, high volume products [Rodrik, 2006; 
Naughton, 2007]. More broadly, it has been shown that while in recent years “China’s 
manufacturing export bundle increasingly overlaps with that of the world’s most 
developed economies … within product markets, China’s exports sell at an increasing 
discount relative to the exports of the OECD” [Schott, 2008, p.34]. This would seem to 
be further proof of a specialization pattern of an as yet developing economy, far from 
what had been achieved by JTK by the end of their quarter century growth bursts. 
Conclusions 
The foregoing has suggested, not unsurprisingly, that Chinese economic 
developments, since reforms began in the late 1970s, have shown both similarities and 
differences with those experienced by JTK in their high growth eras. The most obvious 
similarities are at the level of broad macroeconomic indicators and policies. GDP 
growth was exceptional in all four countries as were their saving and investment rates 
and their striking performances on the world market for manufactured goods. And 
while under-valued exchange rates may have played some role in boosting exports, 
neither this, nor rapid growth, were accompanied by high inflation and/or large budget 
deficits. On the contrary, all the four countries here considered followed 
macroeconomic policies that were broadly orthodox. Real interest rates were almost 
certainly held at positive levels in most years and budgets were usually kept in surplus. 
Few, if any, other developing economies could boast of such a record. 
At a less aggregate level, however, differences do emerge. Differences also exist 
between the experiences of Japan, Korea and, especially, Taiwan. Yet, the gap between 
these three economies on the one hand and China on the other seems greater. At one 
obvious level it relates to the organizational structure of the four countries. JTK were 
(and, of course, still are) market economies; China began the period as a planned 
economy and, despite rapid liberalization, still maintains numerous aspects of central 
command. At the same time, however, the governments of JTK intervened quite heavily 
at the sectoral level, trying to influence their countries’ industrial structure and forge 
their comparative advantages. China seems to have eschewed detailed industrial policies, 
allowing the flourishing of a largely unregulated private (and foreign) enterprise sector. 
While Japan and Korea consciously shifted their industrial structure from light to heavy 
industry, China, initially at least, found itself doing almost the opposite, by reducing the 
weight of the heavy industry it had inherited from its Maoist past. It was the much more 
spontaneous development of domestic TVEs and foreign firms, via FDI, that lies 
behind China’s export specialization and extraordinary world market successes. 
By East Asian standards, in other words, China may have been closer, at least in 
this aspect, to the experience of some South-East Asian countries than to that of the 
North-East Asian ones. But if one were to enlarge one’s sphere of comparison to the 
rest of the developing world, then, surely, China’s last quarter century of economic 
history would still seem to broadly fit the “East Asian Model of Development” that this 
paper discusses. Thus, Table 3 looks at growth rates in China, JTK and four other large 278 
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developing economies that at some time or other, over the last half century or so, have 
shown rapid growth rates over a 25 years period: Brazil, India, Mexico and Turkey. The 
differences between the two columns are striking. 
A broader illustration of differences is provided by Charts 7 and 8, which use 
the simple visual technique of so-called “diamond” charts [e.g. Wade, 2004]. Data 
availability limits the scope of the comparison to simple macroeconomic indicators: four 
were chosen (GDP per capita growth, budget balances and saving rates in per cent of 
GDP, and changes in the share of the world market for manufactures over the various 
25 year periods selected for each country). Chart 7 shows China’s performance in 
comparison with that of JTK; Chart 8 does the same in comparison with the other four 
developing economies. The conclusion that can be drawn from these diagrams would 
seem obvious: by North-East Asian standards, China may be a bit of an outlier; by 
broader comparative standards, it would seem to stand very firmly in the East Asian 
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Appendix 














a  (average annual percentage 
changes) 
Japan (1950-70)  0.4  2.0  3.7  6.1 
Taiwan (1960-85)  2.0  6.2
b  4.9  6.2 
Korea (1965-90)  1.5  2.5
c 10.0  11.4 
China (1980-2005)  1.1  2.2  5.3  5.9 
a. Nominal lending rates minus GDP deflator. 
b. 1962-85. 
c. 1980-90. 
Sources: The Bank of Korea, National Income of Korea, 1982; Haver Analytics; Historical Statistics of Japan, Vol.III; 
IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues); Korea Statistical Yearbook (various issues); OECD, National 
Accounts of OECD Countries, 1950-1968, Economic Outlook Database; Okhawa and Shinohara (1979); Oxford 
Economics Data Bank; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China. 
 
Table 2. Educational Attainments 
Per cent of over 25 years old population 
with:    GDP per 
capita
a  Full primary educ.  Full secondary educ. 
Japan (1950)  1,921  22.4  15.7 
Taiwan (1960)  1,492  13.7   4.6 
Korea (1965)  1,436  33.5   7.8 
China (1980)  821  12.2   5.6 
Memorandum items (1970): 
Latin America  3,989  17.4  4.5 
MiddleEast & N. Afr.  3,106  5.1  3.0 
East Asia  1,685  17.4  4.7 
Sub-Sah. Africa  1,011  4.4  1.7 
South Asia  861  7.4  1.8 
a. In 1990 dollars at purchasing power parity. 
Sources: Barro and Lee (2000); Groningen Growth and Development Centre Database; Maddison (2003). 282 
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Table 3. GDP Per Capita Growth in Selected Developing Countries (average annual percentage changes) 
East Asia    Others   
Japan (1950-75)  7.4  Turkey (1950-75)  3.6 
Taiwan (1960-85)  7.0  Brazil (1955-80)  4.1 
Korea (1965-90)  7.5  Mexico (1955-80)  3.4 
China (1980-2005)  7.0  India (1980-2005)  3.9 




Chart 1. GDP PER CAPITA
(1990 $; in purchasing power parities;                  















Sources : Groningen Growth and Development Centre Database; 
Maddison (2003).  
 Andrea Boltho, Maria Weber, Did China follow the East Asian development model? 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
(in per cent of GDP; 3 years moving averages)
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Sources : Korea Statistical Yearbook ; OECD,  National Accounts of OECD Countries  and Economic Outlook Data Bank; Okhawa 
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Chart 3. EXPORT PERFORMANCE
Share in world exports of manufactures                











Sources : GATT and WTO.
Chart 4. REAL EXCHANGE RATES*
















* Based on relative wholesale prices (for more detail, see text).
Sources : Central Bank of the Republic of China; Haver Analytics; IMF, 
International Financial Statistics ; Oxford Economics Data Bank; US 
Department of Labor.  
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Chart 5. FOREIGN TRADE         
GDP RATIOS
(ratio of exports and imports of goods and services 















Sources : Korea Statistical Yearbook ; OECD Economic Outlook Data 
Bank; Okhawa and Shinohara (1979); Oxford Economics Data Bank; 
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China .
Chart 6. CORRELATIONS WITH 






* Revealed comparative advantage indices for manufacturing exports
  at 3 digit SITC level.
** Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam.
*** BanglaDesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Source : Statistics Canada.
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Sources : GATT; Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre  Database;  Korea 
Statistical Yearbook ;  Maddison (2003); 
National Income of Korea , 1982; OECD, 
Economic Oulook Database and  National 
Accounts of OECD Countries ; Okhawa and 
Shinohara (1979); Oxford Economics Data 
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China; WTO.  286 
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Sources : Anuario Estadistico de Mexico ; 
GATT; Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre  Database;  Instituto national de 
estadistica,  10 anos de indicatores 
economicos y sociales de Mexico ; Instituto 
Brasileiro de Economia, Centro de Estudos 
Fiscais; Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatistica,  Estatisticas do seculo XX ; OECD, 
Economic Oulook Database and  National 
Accounts of OECD Countries ; Oxford 
Economics Data Bank; Turkish Statistical 
Institute,  Statistical Indicators, 1923-2007 ; 
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